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Bubbles and Trading Frenzies:
Evidence from the Art Market
Abstract
The art market is subject to frequent booms and busts in both prices and vol-
ume, which are difficult to reconcile with models where agents are rational and
hold homogenous beliefs. This paper shows that (i) volume is mainly driven by
speculative transactions; (ii) positive price-volume correlation is pervasive across
art movements, and is larger for the most volatile segments of the art market; (iii)
volume predicts negative long-term returns, a relation that is statistically and eco-
nomically large. Overall, our evidence supports the bubble model of Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003), which predicts that speculative trading can generate significant
price bubbles, even if trading costs are huge and leverage is impossible.
As a collector, I trade all the time, it’s the capitalist in me.1
In January 1989, Financial Times journalist Robin Duthy (1989) wrote: “The art
market today is in a sound state, but the danger is that the long run of sparkling results
for paintings by Monet, Van Gogh, and other household names will create an illusion that
all art is safely strapped in on some kind of magic escalator.” In the five-year period from
1985 to 1989, art prices had grown by 164%, in a context of record sales and apparent
overoptimism. In the subsequent two years, real prices bounced back to their 1986 levels.
A similar run up in prices, and subsequent collapse, was to a lesser extent reproduced in
2002-2008, and many are those who see another “bubble” in current prices.
Speaking of “bubbles” requires a definition of fundamental value, which is challenging
when applied to art. As art prices soar, art dealers, auctioneers, and art gallery sales
people often emphasize the resell value, while after a bust, they tend to comfort collectors
by stating that pleasure is the best dividend when investing in art. For economists, works
of art differ from traditional assets or durable goods in that they yield a non-pecuniary
aesthetic or utility dividend. This utility dividend can be seen as the rent one would be
willing to pay to own this work of art over a given time frame. It can reflect aesthetic
pleasure but also has the ability to signal its owner’s wealth. The value of this dividend is
1Quoted in the Wall Street Journal (Peers, 2008).
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of course unobservable and is likely to vary tremendously across art collectors. As pointed
by Lovo and Spaenjers (2014), however, the auction market introduces a common-value
element into prices. The price of a work of art should therefore equal the present value
of future (private) utility dividends over one’s expected holding period, plus the expected
(market) resell value, i.e. the discount rate model could be use to price art. We can readily
propose a definition of fundamental value. Assuming the last bidder on a work of art is
the one who values it the most, the fundamental value of an artwork is his own private
value. Hence, a “bubble” corresponds to a market where agents are willing to pay more
than their private value, because they expect to resell later at a larger price.2
Viewing art as an asset helps understand the possible sources of art price fluctuations.
The most straightforward explanation is that the utility dividends fluctuate over time as
they depend on buyers’ willingness to pay for art, which in turn depends on their pref-
erences and wealth3 (Mandel, 2009). In order to explain art prices volatility, preferences
regarding art and culture as a whole would have to fluctuate dramatically. Even if fads
can temporarily emerge for some specific artists or school of art (Penasse et al., 2014),
the previous literature has shown that tastes tend to be very stable, even in the long run
(Ginsburgh and Weyers, 2008; Graddy, 2014).4 Alternatively, the utility dividend can
oscillate because people’s wealth fluctuates over time. The literature has provided evi-
dence supporting this idea, which we denote as the luxury consumption hypothesis. For
example Goetzmann et al. (2011) find cointegrating relationships between top incomes
and art prices. Finally, art’s fundamental value can fluctuate because the discount rate,
i.e. the risk premium associated to holding works of art changes over time.5
A salient feature of art price booms is that they are accompanied, and sometimes
preceded, by large volumes. Figure 1 shows that the total number of transactions rose
45% from 1985 until its peak in 1989, and many segments of the market reached much
2Two years before the 1990 bust, the following quote appeared in the New York Times: “Paintings
that used to sell for $400,000 are now going for $4 million to $5 million. [. . . ] And when you pay those
prices, you’re an investor. You’ll see the paintings bought at these sales come up for auction again in
several years” (Glueck, 1988).
3Assuming that art consumption increases with wealth, i.e. that works of art are luxury goods.
4Citing Stigler and Becker (1977), LeRoy (2004) further argues “against relying on assumed preference
shifts to explain price fluctuations, especially when there exist alternative explanations that do not appeal
to preference shifts.”
5Fluctuations in the discount rate is the most straightforward explanation of asset prices fluctuation
within efficient markets (Cochrane, 2011).
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higher levels. For example, during the same period, the prices and volume of Pop artists
respectively rose 354% and 167%; more works by Andy Warhol where sold in 1989 than
in the four previous years combined. The positive correlation between the art prices and
volume corroborates a similar observation about many historical bubbles, such as the
South Sea Bubble, or more recently the Internet bubble in the late 1990s.6 Moreover,
the share of short-term transactions, identified as purchases that were resold within the
next year, rose from 10% to almost 20%. This is a remarkable increase, knowing that the
transaction costs in auction markets are minimally 25% of the hammer price. Interestingly,
the relation between prices and volume is not confined to a few episodes or markets. Price
increases generally coincide with rises in volume: between 1976 and 2006, the correlation
between changes in art prices and changes in art volume was as high as 54%.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
What can explain such trading frenzies? In traditional asset pricing models agents
cannot trade when they share identical prior beliefs (Tirole, 1982; Milgrom and Stokey,
1982), they rather trade to consume, i.e. because their preferences, or wealth, differ. The
rationality assumption rules out any form of speculative trading, because in such models
agents agree on economic fundamentals and therefore cannot expect to make a profit by
reselling later. Several seminal papers, in contrast, emphasize the role of speculation on
price formation when agents hold heterogeneous beliefs or priors (Miller, 1977; Harris
and Raviv, 1993). For example, agents can trade because they are overconfident about
their own trading abilities (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003), because they suffer from con-
firmatory bias (Pouget et al., 2014), or because they are trying to infer what others are
thinking (Biais and Bossaerts, 1998). These models suggest that “market sentiment” or
differences of opinion can push prices above fundamentals. Their arguments hinge on the
assumption that short-sale constraints prevent arbitrageurs from pulling back prices to
fundamentals (Miller, 1977; Baker and Stein, 2004). When prices are high, pessimists
6See e.g. Cochrane (2003); Ofek and Richardson (2003). Xiong (2013) notes that classical economists
such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Knut Wicksell, and Irving Fischer readily proposed the concept
of “overtrading,” the process whereby euphoric investors buy assets solely in anticipation of future capital
gains (Kindleberger, 1978). The first historical bubbles where readily characterized by trading frenzies.
For example, Carlos et al. (2006) show that turnover in the shares of the Bank of England, the East India
Company, and the Royal African Company increased dramatically during the South Sea Bubble of 1720.
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would like to short sell, but instead simply stay out of the market or sell to optimists
at inflated prices. Moreover, optimists may be willing to pay higher prices than their
own valuations, because they expect to resell to even more optimistic investors in the
future (Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). The difference between
their willingness to pay and their own optimistic valuation is the price of the option to
resell the asset in the future. The price of the resale option imparts a stationary bubble
component in asset prices, and can explain price fluctuations unrelated to macroeconomic
fundamentals. This mechanism is particularly appealing in explaining art price fluctua-
tions, because in art markets short selling is not possible and, absent a rental market, the
only possibility to make a profit is by reselling at a higher price.
It is important to stress that speculative trading is not the only cause of price-volume
correlation.7 Price-volume correlation can also arise when the market is subject to supply
or demand shocks, and if supply is less elastic than demand (or reciprocally). A prominent
example of demand shock is the Japanese stock and real estate “bubble” of the late
1980s. Hiraki et al. (2009) document how Japanese collectors entered the market chasing
French Impressionist art, pushing both prices and volumes up. They argue that their
findings reflect luxury consumption, consistent with predictions of consumption capital
asset pricing models (Aı̈t-Sahalia et al., 2004). Lovo and Spaenjers (2014) present a
dynamic auction model where transaction prices and voluntary trading volume increase
when the economy enters an expansion, and decrease when a recession commences. A
crucial difference between the two former explanations of trading volume is that the latter
is silent about who trades and about the kind of goods that are traded. Further, resale
option theory states that a high volume should be associated to prices above fundamental
value, so that a high trading volume should predict negative returns.
In this paper, we use a comprehensive data set of nearly 1.1 million auction sales to
study asset price fluctuations and trading in the fine art auction market. First, we intend
to analyze what drives trading volume. The previous literature, which has extensively
studied the demand for works of art, has remained silent on the informational content
of trading volume. We have presented two competing theories — the speculative trading
7To avoid making this paper too cumbersome, we will liberally speak of price-volume correlation.
What we mean is correlation between log-differences.
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theory and the luxury consumption theory — that can explain a correlation between
prices and volume. Consonant with the speculative trading hypothesis, we find that the
share of very short-term transactions, the sales rate, and the share of the riskier art
movements increase when volume increases. While prices increase with top incomes, as
predicted by the luxury consumption hypothesis, the contemporaneous relation of top
income augmentation with volume is positive but insignificant.
Second, we find that the positive contemporaneous price-volume correlation is robust
and pervasive across art movements and that the riskier (respectively, safer) artists tend
to exhibit higher (lower) price-volume correlation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, riskier art
(Pop, Abstract Expressionism, Minimalism and Contemporary art) belongs to the second
half of twentieth century, while safer art (Romanticism, Baroque, Rococo) ended no later
than the first half of the nineteenth century.
While supportive of the speculative trading hypothesis, these findings are not yet
conclusive. Our third objective is thus to study whether a high volume coincides with
overpricing, which is the most important prediction of the resale option theory (Hong
and Stein, 2007). Although the fundamental value of art is unobservable, a clear test
of overpricing is that volume negatively predicts returns, while controlling for potential
changes in fundamental value. Crucially, our dataset contains more than 20,000 pairs
of transactions where identical items have been identified at the time of purchase and
subsequent resale. This enables us to test directly the overpricing prediction of the resale
option theory. In order to control for changes in fundamental value, we then turn to
the classic capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to express art excess returns in terms of
systematic risk, and additionally control for changes in artist fame and changes in volume.
A one standard deviation increase in volume will on average increase future excess returns
by 15.1% over the holding period, or 2.6% per year. This long-term effect of volume on
art returns is much larger than the effect of stock returns (5.5% on average) and the effect
of taste (6% on average). Importantly, this relation is robust across time, which means
our results are not driven by the 1990s boom.
Our paper contributes to a number of strands of the literature.
First, we provide evidence supporting a resale option theory and, in particular, the
bubble model of Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). The previous literature has provided
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empirical evidence related to events limited in time, such as the Chinese warrant bubble
(Xiong and Yu, 2011) and the Chinese A-B share premia (Mei et al., 2009). Palfrey
and Wang (2012) also find evidence of speculative overpricing in laboratory-controlled
asset markets. Our finding is novel, in that overpricing is not driven by a single event.
Speculation occurs in spite of huge transaction costs, as conjectured by Scheinkman and
Xiong (2003). We directly relate the large fluctuations in art prices to a stationary
overpricing component. We argue that this overpricing component, which is proxied by
trading volume, induces predictability in art returns.8 Bubbles in the art market are
unique in that they can start in the absence of large uncertainty or innovation9 and are
not driven by excess credit or leverage (Stein, 1995; Geanakoplos, 2010).
Second, our data enables us to examine the empirical relation between prices and vol-
ume. While this relation has been extensively examined in other asset markets, including
the housing market,10 virtually no research exists on markets of collectibles. Ashenfelter
and Graddy (2011) study sales rates at art auctions, but not volume per se. Bai et al.
(2013) examine volume through the lens of international trade. Our set-up is complemen-
tary to that of Korteweg et al. (2013) and Lovo and Spaenjers (2014), who examine how
changes in market values correlate with the likelihood of trading for individual artworks.
Third, our paper extends the understanding of the drivers of “emotional asset” prices.
Previous research has insisted on the role of wealth, proxied by equity returns and changes
in the income distribution (Goetzmann et al., 2011; Hiraki et al., 2009). Interestingly,
Hiraki et al. (2009) explains the 1990 art price bubble in fundamental terms: luxury
consumption by Japanese art collectors pushed international art prices up until the art
bubble burst as a direct consequence of the collapse of the Japanese real estate market.
We provide an alternative interpretation emphasizing speculative dynamics, which has
been largely overlooked by the literature. Penasse et al. (2014) use survey data to show
that optimism about individual contemporary artists has predictive power of short-run
8This stands in marked contrast to the purely rational view that argues that changes in the discount
factor induces return predictability (see Cochrane (2011) for an overview of this literature). A recent paper
by Cujean and Hasler (2014) also argues that disagreement generates predictability over the business cycle.
9Innovation and uncertainty is an inherent element of asset prices bubbles (see e.g. Xiong (2013)),
which complicates the identification of bubbles even ex post. See, e.g. Pastor and Veronesi (2006) for a
rational explanation of the 1990 internet bubble.
10See Genesove and Mayer (2001), Clayton et al. (2008); see also Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) and
Favara and Song (2013) for arguments in terms of overpricing.
7
art returns, in line with the idea that fads affect the prices of individual artists. In a
similar vein, Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013) construct an aggregate art market sentiment
indicator, based on sales volume, buy-in rates, and the tone of press reports on the art
market, which covaries with art prices. Still, that study does not address a price-volume
correlation nor provides evidence of return predictability.11
Fourth, we shed more light on the behavioral anomalies that characterize the auction
market. Mei and Moses (2005) show that high estimates at the time of purchase are
associated with adverse subsequent abnormal returns, which suggests that credulous col-
lectors are likely to be influenced by biased presale estimates. Beggs and Graddy (2009)
and Graddy et al. (2014) provide evidence of anchoring and loss aversion in art auctions.
De Silva et al. (2012) show that investors’ emotional state (in their paper influenced by
the weather at the time of the auction) can affect price formation of paintings with a
relative high private value. Pesando and Shum (2007) present anecdotal evidence of “ir-
rational exuberance” in the prices realized at the 1997 sale of the collection of Victor and
Sally Ganz at Christie’s in New York. They argue that the buyers of five Picasso prints
probably overpaid, as evidenced by the dramatically lower prices realized by these prints
in their subsequent appearances at auction. Our results suggest that this tendency of
collectors to overpay is significant and pervasive.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We present our dataset in Section
I. Section II provides evidence on what drives volume. Our core results are presented in
Sections III and IV, where we study price-volume correlation across art movements and
show that volume has long-term predictive power. Section V discusses the interpretation
of our empirical findings and Section VI concludes.
I. Data
This paper uses the historical data set constructed by Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013),
which comprises information on more than one million transactions of art at auction
11Two recent papers also investigate the short-term dynamics of art prices. Pownall et al. (2013)
employ a regime switching model to describe the dynamics of art prices using a threshold variable that
drives prices into possibly locally explosive regimes. Kräussl et al. (2014) use a right-tailed unit root test
with forward recursive regressions to detect explosive behaviors in the prices of four different art market
segments.
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over the period from 1957 until 2007. The dataset initially overweighs the London sales,
but as of the middle of the 1970s, the coverage consists of all major auction houses
around the world. We thus concentrate our analysis of price and volume on the 1976-
2006 period.12 The sales concern oil/acrylic paintings and works on paper (water colors,
gouaches, etchings, prints) by more than 10,000 artists. Almost half of the artists are
classified into one or more of the following movements: Medieval & Renaissance; Baroque;
Rococo; Neoclassicism; Romanticism; Realism; Impressionism & Symbolism; Fauvism
& Expressionism; Cubism, Futurism & Constructivism; Dada & Surrealism; Abstract
Expressionism; Pop; Minimalism & Contemporary.13 For the purposes of the current
study, we create a separate subsample of transactions for each of these movements. If
an artist is categorized under more than one movement, we assign all the sales of his
or her work to the art movement the artist has most contributed to.14 As a result,
there is no overlap between the different subsamples, and correlations between the return
estimates and volume changes across movements cannot be driven by the repeated use of
the same data. The number of sales in the movement subsamples ranges from 10,485 for
Neoclassicism to 102,234 for Baroque.
We make use of this dataset in two ways. First, we construct a panel data set of art
returns and transaction volumes for 13 art movements. Second, we use identical resale
pairs to test long-term predictions on actual transactions.
A. Times Series Data
We build aggregate and movement-specific real price indexes by applying a hedonic regres-
sion model to the full dataset and to each subsample (see Appendix VI for a description of
our hedonic regression model). To construct our measure of trading volume, we record the
number of observed transactions for each year in the period 1976 to 2006. Our database
does not include buy-ins (i.e., items that do not reach the reserve price set by the seller),
and we thus work with the numbers of lots that actually sold. We construct a proxy for
12We do do not include 2007 because our data set doesn’t span the full year.
13See Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013) for details on the compilation of the list of artists, the classifi-
cation of artists into movements, and the collection of sales information.
14For example, Edgar Degas is classified both under Realism and under Impressionism & Symbolism.
We will use the sales of his work only to estimate the price and volume changes in the market for Realism.
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the average sales rate in Section II.
Figure 2 presents the evolution of price and volume over our time frame. There is a
strong cross-sectional correlation in prices, as previously documented by, e.g., Ginsburgh
and Philippe (1995); Worthington and Higgs (2003). Interestingly, the volume series
are also significantly cross-sectionally correlated. A regression of movement-level series
on market-level series yields an R-squared of 0.63 for returns and 0.44 for changes in
volume. Some art movements are clearly riskier than others: for example, Pop art prices
culminated in 1990 to levels more than 5 times their 1984 level, in real terms. Our index
suggests that Pop art prices subsequently fell by 83%.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The riskiest art movements are shown to also be the most profitable bets. Table I
presents the summary statistics on price and volume series. There is a clear risk-return
relationship: the correlation between return and volatility is as high as 81.6%, as is ex-
hibited by Panel (a) of Figure 3. Price and volume volatility are of the same order of
magnitude; the riskier (safer) movements also exhibit more (less) volatile volume. Unsur-
prisingly, the riskier movements (Pop, Abstract Expressionism, Minimalism and Contem-
porary art) belong to the second half of twentieth century, i.e. Modern and Contemporary
Art, while the safer (Romanticism, Baroque, Rococo) are Old Masters, i.e. ended no later
than the first half of the nineteenth century.
We also report correlations between price and volume. The correlations are extremely
high, 54% for the aggregate indices, as they are also induced by the impressive boom and
bust that characterized both prices and volume during the 1990 bubble. As can be seen in
Panel (b) of Figure 3, the riskiest schools of art are characterized by the highest correlation
between prices and volumes. This pattern is reminiscent of Lee and Swaminathan (2000),
who find that high (low) volume stocks exhibit many glamour (value) characteristics.15 In
our analysis, we will therefore consider subsamples using “High Volatility” (Pop, Abstract
Expressionism, Minimalism and Contemporary art) and “Low Volatility” (Romanticism,
Baroque, Rococo) artists.
15In the absence of a significant rental market for art, we cannot compute valuation ratios such as rent
to price ratios. Any definition of glamour and value is necessarily informal and based on the “test of
time”.
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[Insert Table I and Figure 3 about here]
B. Repeat-sale Data
We also use a subset of the dataset for which pairs of identical, or at least very similar
objects of art can be identified. Each resale pair is considered as a unique point in our
dataset, and the resales comprise 22,716 observations, spanning 1976 to 2006. For each
pair of transactions, we observe the purchase and sale prices, P bi and P
s
i , expressed in
logarithm. The log-return for holding a work of art i between the date of purchase bi and
the date of sale si is thus given by P
s
i − P bi . The average holding period in our sample is
5.7 years.
We make use of this dataset to test the predictive relation between volume and returns,
as well as price mean reversion. A potential concern is that selection bias may affect the
interpretation of our results. For example, ? argues that both the upper and lower tails of
art return distribution may not be observed, because works of art that fall out of fashion
or are acquired by museums and major private collections are unlikely to reappear on the
market. If present, such censoring is likely to be fairly small. The correlation between
returns computed using a repeat-sale estimator on this subsample and the art returns
using the hedonic estimator is 0.98. Both indices also show very similar long-term trends,
which implies that survivorship bias is likely to be very small. Finally, the distribution
of sale-to-sale returns (not shown) is quite symmetric (with a skewness of 0.27) and no
particular discontinuity can be observed in the tails of the distribution.
We complete the dataset by constructing a measure of volume at the transaction level.
We first collect the total number of sales on the last twelve months preceding t. Following
Baker and Stein (2004), we then normalize our series by the average volume over the last
















where vm,t is the number of transactions for movement m observed in a given month
t. In order to use the largest number of observations, we assign the aggregate measure
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of volume to artists who are not matched to a specific movement. Aggregate volume is
defined as above, but using the entire data set instead of summing the sales of a specific
movement. Detrending the series brings about several benefits. First, as can be seen in
Figure 4 for market volume, Equation (1) generates a persistent series. Such a property
is desirable for a variable that is expected to predict long-term returns. Second, volume
supposedly proxies for the price of the resale option — the overpricing component in prices
— and this component must be stationary. Third, Equation (1) gives us a relatively high
frequency series, which is not affected by art market seasonality. Finally, the series is
constructed recursively, which ensures that only information that is truly available to the
investor when making his forecast appears in his information set.
We merge these series with our repeat-sale dataset: for each resale pair, we record the
value of VOLUMEm,t at the month preceding the purchase and at the month preceding
the sale.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Finally, we add controls for potential changes in fundamental value between the two
transactions dates. As we have already emphasized the prominent role of stock market
wealth effects on art prices (Hiraki et al., 2009; Goetzmann et al., 2011), we use the
Global Financial Data (GFD) world index to proxy for worldwide equity wealth and
equity systematic risk. In line with Mei and Moses (2005), we also include controls for
other risk factors, namely the Fama-French factors Fama and French (1996) and the
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Finally, we use the one-month Treasury
bill rate as the risk-free rate.
Although tastes are relatively slow-moving (Graddy, 2014), we proxy for potential
changes in tastes by measuring temporal variation in artist fame. To do so, we collect the
percentage of mentions of each artist name in the English-language books digitized by
Google Books (Michel et al., 2011; Google, 2012). We find annual series for 2190 artists
(out of 2769), which leave us with 20,604 resale pairs with taste information.
Table II gives the descriptive statistics for the repeat-sale database, expressed in log
difference between the time of first and second transaction. For art, we see an average
excess return of 1.2% over an average holding period of 5.7 years, with a standard deviation
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of 78%. Equities are undoubtedly financially dominating art, with an excess return of
nearly 12% and a standard deviation of almost 29% over the period 1976-2006. Volume
barely changes on average (-3%), and was much less volatile (19% standard deviation),
which reflects our choice of smoothing the volume series. Finally, the percentage of
mentions of each artist (fame) fell 7% on average and has a dispersed distribution (the
standard deviation is 44%).
[Insert Table II about here]
Interestingly, this large volatility at the artist level averages out at movement level,
as depicted by Figure 5. Over our sample period, we observe the increasing popularity of
Andy Warhol, while the share of mentions of his name in Google Books increased by 88%.
Roy Lichtenstein, another famous Pop artist, also gained increasing attention over our
sample period. By contrast, Figure 5 shows that the exposure of the average Pop artist
remained largely stable for three decades. We observe similar patterns for the other art
movements: artist trajectories can be erratic, but the degree of exposure is very stable at
the aggregate level. This illustrates the fact that tastes move very slowly, as pointed out
by Graddy (2014), and that changes in tastes cannot explain the dramatic fluctuations
that characterized art prices during that period.
[Insert Figure 5 about here]
II. The Information Content of Volume
In a recent survey on art collecting, only a tenth of the respondents said they bought art
purely as an investment, whereas 75% cited enjoyment as the key motivation (Barclays,
2012). Such a financially disinterested behavior stands in contrast with the steady growth
of the art-as-an-investment industry. The specialized press regularly reports the creation
of art funds, or the launch of services targeted at private investors who want to build
up an art collection for investment purposes.16 Besides surveys and anecdotal evidence,
16For example, the Fine Art Fund Group, started by Philip Hoffman, a former finance director at
Christie’s, launched a managed art portfolio service targeted at high-net-worth individuals. The minimum
investment for this type of fund is $1m over three years (Powley, 2013).
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little is known about what drives volume in the fine art auction market. Since the seminal
study of Baumol (1986), the literature has extensively considered what drives the demand
for art, but overlooked supply and therefore volume. This makes perfect sense, as far as
the supply side is thought as the production of works of art. Unless one discovers a
forgotten masterpiece in a local flea market, the supply of works of art is inelastic — to
the very least for dead artists. However, the traditional view overlooks the existence of a
secondary market where collectors can sell. In a rational model such as Mandel (2009),
such a secondary market doesn’t exist.
In fact, the purely rational view predicts that collectors should not trade at all. This is
due to the “no-trade theorem”: if one agent considers trading with another agent, each of
them needs to consider why the other agent might be willing to trade at a particular price,
which results in no trade (Tirole, 1982; Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). In order to generate
trade in a rational model, one needs to assume that people are different. According to
this view, people trade in the art market for idiosyncratic liquidity reasons or because
their wealth or tastes differ. A change in the population of bidders can thus affect art’s
fundamental value and generate volume. Any increase in demand, if deemed permanent,
logically leads to higher fundamental prices. Lovo and Spaenjers (2014) show that it can
also lead to a contemporaneous increase in volume, even in a rational model where prices
follow macroeconomic fundamentals. It is not clear, however, to what extent changes in
the population of bidders can explain the sizeable price-volume correlation documented
in this paper. In particular, since art yields conspicuous utility (Mandel, 2009), the utility
of owning art should increase with prices, thus reducing the incentive to sell when the
entry of new buyers pushes prices up.
In contrast to the purely rational view on trading, resale option models argue that
speculation is an important driver of trading volume. Speculative trading arises whenever
someone buys an item above its own private valuation, in order to resell it later at a higher
price. A prominent example of such investment scheme is the purchase of Van Gogh’s
Portrait of Doctor Gachet in 1990 at the then record price of $82.5 million. The Portrait
was sold within three minutes to Ryoei Saito, Japan’s second-largest paper manufacturer.
Immediately after taking possession of the painting, he secured it in a climate-controlled
warehouse where it remained unexhibited for seven years (Taylor, 2012).
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In order to distinguish consumption-driven trading from speculative trading, we look
at the composition of aggregate volume. In the introduction of this paper, we showed
that the share of short-term transactions peaked during the 1990 bubble. Given the huge
transaction costs that characterize the art market, it is very unlikely that these works of
art were bought for the pure “retinal” pleasure. These transactions thus credibly proxy
for the frenzied trading predicted by Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). We construct this
variable by means of the repeat-sale sample, and define it as the share of purchases that
were resold within the next year. These resale pairs account for 10% to 30% of trading
volume within our sample.
A common thread in the disagreement literature is that trading volume appears to act
as an indicator of investor sentiment (Baker and Stein, 2004; Hong and Stein, 2007). A
high volume is supposed to be symptomatic of overvaluation, signifying that the market is
dominated by optimists. The following two variables therefore proxy for market sentiment.
Our first proxy for sentiment is the sales rate, the percentage of the lots sold in
an auction. Sellers of individual artworks usually set a secret reserve price and if the
highest bid does not reach this level, the items are “bought in” and go unsold. The
convention in the art market is that the reserve price is set at or below the auctioneer’s
low estimate. There is anecdotal evidence that the sales rate tends to be lower in depressed
markets where prices are lower and are therefore less likely to meet sellers’ reserve prices
(Thorncroft, 1990). Ashenfelter and Graddy (2011) find that the sales rate is not related
to art prices, but is strongly positively related to unexpected price changes, defined as
the difference between the hammer price and the presale estimate produced by auction
house experts. A higher sales rate may therefore indicate that the market is dominated
by optimists, who are willing to pay more than sellers’ reserve price, which are themselves
related to expert estimates. Ashenfelter and Graddy (2011) indeed report that sales rates
crashed in the bust of the 1990 bubble. Since our dataset does not include items that
were bought in, we construct a proxy for the sales rate. For each auction, we divide the
number of observed transactions by the maximum lot number. We then take, for each
year, the average sales rate across auctions as our proxy for the aggregate sales rate, from
1976 to 2006.
Newspaper articles also suggest that the share of Modern and Contemporary art is
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higher in “hot” markets. For example, Thorncroft (1992) reports a flight to quality (i.e. to
Old Masters paintings) after the 1990 bubble burst: “the auction world has returned to its
traditional ways, where connoisseurs rule and established works of art hold pride of place.”
This can be related to sentiment for two reasons. First, overconfident collectors are more
likely to hunt for relatively young artists with larger upside potential, just as overconfident
investors scrutinize the stock market hoping to find the next Google.17 When sentiment
is low, trading should decrease and be confined to the less speculative art movements.
Second, we expect collectors who engage in speculative trading to turn to the most liquid
items available. Modern and contemporary items are arguably more liquid than items
from older schools of art, which are to a larger extent locked up in museums or private
collections.18 A high share of modern and contemporary art in the aggregate trading
volume thus signals that the market is dominated by optimistic speculators. We therefore
construct a second proxy for sentiment consisting of the annual share of Modern and
Contemporary art, which corresponds to our “High Volatility” group (Pop Art, Abstract
Expressionism, Minimalism, and Contemporary art).
We would also like to know to what extent prices and volume correlate with changes in
the population of bidders. The previous literature has emphasized the role of wealth, and
in particular the wealth of the most privileged members of society, as drivers of art prices.
In line with Goetzmann et al. (2011), we use the data from Piketty and Saez (2006) to
build a consistent series of the share of total income received by the top 0.1 percent of all
income earners in the US.
Finally, it is of independent interest to understand whether volume increases mostly
because of an increase of demand, or because a higher number of items are offered for
sale. Both theories predict that higher prices should be associated with a larger number of
works of art offered for sale. If sentiment is high and art prices are above their fundamental
values, pessimists will react and put more items for sale. Moreover, auction houses are
more likely to solicit potential sellers in “hot” markets (Pesando and Shum, 2008). On the
17Tobias Meyer, who in 2006 was the director of Sotheby’s contemporary art department worldwide,
said to the New York Times (Vogel, 2006): “Collectors want to beat the galleries at their own game
[. . . ]. This insatiable need for stardom has made buying student work the art-world version of ‘American
Idol.’”
18Modern and contemporary art should thus enjoy a higher level of liquidity, ex ante. A simple
coordination argument suggests that they should be even more liquid ex post, because liquidity is self-
reinforcing.
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other hand, higher prices can attract sellers whose present value of future utility dividends
is below the expected auction price.19 As a proxy for the number of art objects offered
for sale, we use the number of transactions divided by our sales rate.
Table III presents the correlation matrix of the percentage changes in price, volume,
and the percentage changes in the five variables discussed above (the share of short-
term transactions, the sales rate, the number of art objects offered for sale, the share of
transactions in modern and contemporary art within the global art market, and the top
income). We see that when price and volume increase, the share of short-term transactions
tends to increase. The correlation between volume change and the change in short-term
transactions is a highly significant 0.42.
We also learn from Table III that the sales rate tends to increase with volume. The
correlation is statistically and economically large: 0.36. Volume is, by definition, given
by the number of art objects offered for sale multiplied by the sales rate. If the sales
rate comoves with volume, one may wonder whether volume changes because of changes
in the sales rate. Hiraki et al. (2009) argues that the 1990 bubble was mainly driven
by the influx of Japanese buyers in the art market. Anecdotal evidence also supports
the idea of inexperienced and wealthy collectors competing in auction and buying at
unreasonable prices. More generally, since higher bids are more likely to reach sellers’
reserve prices, the entry of new buyers alone could push the sales rate up, which, in turn,
would mechanically increase volume. We find, instead, that the number of art objects
offered for sale increases in concert with volume. Said otherwise, people trade more, and
not only because of the influx of new buyers. To see that, first consider the correlation
between the sales rate and prices. Table III exhibits a 0.22 correlation, which is less
than half of the price-volume correlation. Also, the former correlation is not statistically
significant, in line with Ashenfelter and Graddy (2011). Moreover, if changes in volume
were only due to demand shocks, the number of art objects offered for sale should not be
correlated to prices. We find a highly significant 0.47 correlation between the offered art
19A prominent example of such an increase in supply was described in the press during the 1990 bubble.
At the peak of the bubble, several major museums, including the Guggenheim in New York, announced
that they were disposing of important works of arts — works by Chagall, Modigliani and Kandinsky.
Although this practice of de-accession is not uncommon, and serves the purpose of financing new ac-
quisitions, it was unusual enough to be qualified a “selling spree” by the Financial Times (Thorncroft,
1990). The timing of the selling indeed suggests museums were trying to benefit from the very high prices
reached by a few star artists (Glueck, 1990).
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objects and prices.
[Insert Table III about here]
In line with the speculative trading hypothesis, we also expect new buyers to be
primarily attracted by Modern and Contemporary art, which offer the most speculative,
glamorous artists. Table III shows that the share of Modern and Contemporary art
does indeed increase with both price and volume (the correlations are 0.59 and 0.52,
respectively). We saw in Section I that the Modern and Contemporary Art movements are
more volatile and exhibit the highest price-volume correlation. These positive correlations
strengthen our argument that, when sentiment is high, buyers and sellers agree to disagree
and turn to the most speculative items.
Finally, Table III provides limited support for the consumption trading hypothesis. In
line with Goetzmann et al. (2011), art returns are significantly correlated with changes in
inequality, with a significant 0.35 correlation, but only modestly and insignificantly with
all measures of trading volume.
III. Price-Volume Correlation
A. Contemporaneous Relation
We now turn to the analysis of price-volume correlation across art movements, using the
time series data described in Section I.A. The central relation between price and volume
is presented in Table IV. Each panel reports fixed effect regression results for the 13 art
movements, as well as for the 3 most volatile and 3 least volatile movements. We first look
at the contemporaneous relation between prices and volumes, and then turn to regressions
including equity returns, which traditionally proxy for changes in wealth.20
[Insert Table IV about here]
Panel A of Table IV documents a significant and pervasive price-volume correlation.
Model 1 reports that a one percent change in volume is associated with an average 0.59%
change in return. Price-volume correlation explains on average 25% of return variance.
20Controlling for changes in top incomes instead of equity returns does not materially affect our results.
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The relation is much stronger for high-risk movements (with an R-squared of nearly 0.40 in
model 3) and much lower for Low Volatility artists (the R-squared is around 0.05, in model
5). Interestingly, the price-volume correlation remains largely intact when controlling
for contemporaneous and lagged stock returns. Moreover, the R-squared increases only
marginally when including stock returns, suggesting that volume is more informative than
stocks in the short run.21
This result is consistent with both consumption and speculative trading, and is there-
fore of little help to distinguish between the theories. As argued in Section II, both
hypotheses predict a causal relation from prices to the number of works of art offered for
sale, and plausibly to the number of transactions. Resale option theory can also predict
a lead-lag relation between lagged volume and prices, if information diffuses slowly. This
is arguably the case for art where, absent a centralized market, information has to diffuse
through the media and by word of mouth. Further, auctions around specific themes occur
infrequently and hence the trading frequency in the art market makes information spread
slowly. Empirical evidence shows that art market returns lag stock returns by a year
(see e.g. Chanel (1995), Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013)), and take at least six months
to reflect information contained in Sotheby’s stock price (Penasse, 2014). It is therefore
likely that sentiment would diffuse slowly into art prices. In the United States housing
bubble, Soo (2013) similarly finds that house prices followed volume with a substantial
lag and shows that both volume and prices were predicted by market sentiment.
In order to disentangle our two main hypotheses, we thus turn to an analysis of lead-lag
relations between prices and volume.
B. Lead-lag Relations
Before turning to the estimation of lead-lag relations, some words of caution must be
spoken regarding the econometric model and the time series used. First, it is well known
that fixed effects regressions with lagged dependent variables generate biased estimates.
The bias is of order 1/T and, given the relatively large time-dimension of our panel (30
years), we do not attempt to remove it. Second, both price and volume indices are by
21Penasse (2014) presents evidence that volume is indeed more informative than stock prices for the
purpose of short-term forecasting.
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construction moving averages over each year and may thus be artificially smooth. Time
aggregation of data can lead to variances that are underestimated and autocorrelations
that are overestimated relative to the true underlying process (Working, 1960). Moreover,
the art auction market is very seasonal, with the second and the fourth quarters of the
year generally witnessing the highest trading intensity and most important sales. In order
to avoid identifying spurious lead-lag relations between price and volume, we construct
distinct price and volume indices from the observations in the fourth quarter (October-
December) of each year.
Panel B of Table IV shows that volume tends to lead prices. The elasticity of current
returns to lagged changes in volume is 0.258 (model 1), a little less than half the elasticity
to current volume, but it remains significant at the 5% level. Again, the contribution
of additional predictors seems marginal: neither lagged stock returns nor lagged price
remain significant when controlling for lagged volume.
Panel C tests the alternative relations where prices lead volume: we regress volume
changes on lagged price changes and control in a second regression for lagged equity
returns and possible volume autocorrelation. Panel C provides limited support for a
causal relation from returns to volume. We only find a borderline significant relation in
the High Volatility group, where a 10% price change forecasts a 2.1% change in volume on
the following year (model 4). All specifications in Panel C show a negative autocorrelation
of volume. A plausible explanation is market timing. Someone with a limited number of
items to sell will put more items at auctions when he sees a selling opportunity, which
will leave him with fewer items to dispose of the year after. A similar argument holds for
a buyer with limited resources and this argument generalizes to auction houses trying to
maximize revenue by soliciting more artworks when they expect higher prices.
IV. Volume and Overpricing
A. Volume Deciles
The most important prediction of asset pricing theories incorporating disagreement is
overpricing (Hong and Stein, 2007). In the absence of short selling, a high trading volume
signals that prices are above the fundamental values of the art objects. A high volume at
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the time of a purchase should predict lower returns while controlling for potential changes
in fundamental value. We test this prediction on our repeat-sale dataset, where each
transaction is identified by its purchase and subsequent resale date. For each resale pair,
we record the sales volume at the time of the purchase and at the time of the sale. As our
analysis concentrates on overpricing, we calculate abnormal real returns, which we define
as the returns in excess of the sample mean of the whole repeat-sale dataset. We construct
“portfolios” based on volume deciles; the largest decile corresponds to the largest volume
relative to five-year average volume. We calculate the annualized abnormal returns of
resale pairs that occurred when volume was within a given decile. For example, market
volume fell within the first decile from September 1982 to June 1983. We collect all
pairs of transactions where the artwork was bought or sold for each decile and record the
average abnormal return as a function of volume decile. Figure 6 exhibits the annualized
abnormal returns as a function of volume; the dashed lines indicate the 5% confidence
bands around the null of absence of abnormal returns.
Buying art when volume was in the highest decile yielded an average abnormal return
of -3.5% per annum. This effect is economically large, compared to the average real
return in our sample, which is 0.8% per annum. In contrast, a high volume of trading
at the time of the sale is associated to abnormal gains of 9.3% per annum, on average.
Symmetrically, low volumes at the selling date tend to be associated with low returns.
For example, selling when volume is at its lowest decile generates an average abnormal
loss of 8.6%. The pattern at the time of resale is stronger than the one at the time of
purchase. We interpret this as evidence of overpricing, although we cannot claim that
this overpricing is predictable, because the “resale” portfolios are constructed based on
volume at the time of sale. Perhaps surprisingly, purchases in the lowest volume decile
did not earn a significant abnormal return in the following years. The reason is that sales
tended to plunge prior to the price crash when the 1990 bubble burst. Hence, a large
fraction of purchases related to the first volume decile took place before prices collapsed,
weighting down the average returns in that particular decile.
Ignoring the purchases in the lowest volume decile, Figure 6 depicts a remarkably
regular pattern across deciles. Buying when volume is low and selling when volume is
high seems a quite profitable strategy (but we ignore transaction costs), and is in line
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with the idea of bubble formation. We repeat this exercise for all subsamples and report
the results in Table V. We find similar or even stronger abnormal returns for the High
Volatility group, but not for the Low Volatility group, which is consistent with our previous
findings on price-volume correlation.
[Insert Figure 6 and Table V about here]
B. Asset Pricing Models
Changes in fundamental value may be responsible for the correlations between price and
volume. We therefore evaluate the impact of volume on future returns by explicitly
controlling for changes in fundamental value, captured by wealth shocks and changes in
tastes. In the spirit of Mei and Moses (2005), we use the classic CAPM model to estimate
the systematic risk of artworks, and employ our worldwide equity index as the market
index. We expand the CAPM model by our artist fame characteristic and volume. After
dropping the observations from 601 artists who do not appear in Google’s books database,

















rit is the return on item i between bi and si, computed as the difference
between the log of sale price and the log of purchase price and where rft is the risk
free rate. On the right hand side, we include the sum of world equity excess returns
between purchase and sale times, measured by MKTt. We also add the change in artist
fame, measured by FAMEa,t. We capture the change in the volume measure VOLUMEm,t
as defined in Equation (1) for movement m. All variables are observed with monthly
frequency, except FAMEa,t, which is only updated annually.
Equation (2) states that the percentage change in the price of an artwork in excess of
the risk-free rate is a function of three factors. The two fundamental factors are changes
in wealth, measured by the percentage increase in the GFD equity index between the
purchase and sale time, and changes in tastes measured by the increase in mentions in
the Google corpus. Our test variable is ν, which measures the impact of changes in
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volume. If the degree of overpricing is proportional to the volume of transactions, we
expect ν to be positive.
In order to control for art exposure to additional risk factors, we also extend our
























VOLUMEm,t + εi (3)
Following, e.g., Mei and Moses (2005), we estimate Equations (2) and (3) using a three-
stage estimation procedure on our sample of repeat sales, based on Case and Shiller
(1987). In a first step, we regress returns on the matrix of regressors using OLS. In a
second stage, we regress the squared residuals from the first step on an intercept and
the time between sales. In a third step, we redo the repeat sales regression (RSR) with
weighted least squares, using the fitted squared residuals as weights.
Table VI presents our empirical findings: controlling for changes in fundamental value,
volume has a large positive impact on returns. The results are consistent across the
samples and models and are also economically significant: for the full sample (model 1),
a one-standard deviation increase in volume (19%) will increase future excess returns by
15.1% over the holding period, or by 2.6% per year. This long-term effect of volume on
art returns is much larger than the effect of stock returns (that is 5.5% on average) and
the effect of taste (which is 6% on average). The impact of volume is however smaller in
magnitude in the subsamples, where a larger fraction of returns is captured by the market
risk factor, while the models are estimated on a much smaller number of observations.
In order to ensure that these findings are not driven by a single event, namely the
1990 “bubble”, we reestimate Equations (2) and (3) by allowing the effect of volume to
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Table VII presents the estimated values for each decade: the coefficients associated with
volume are again significant in each specification. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the impact of
volume is much larger during the 1987-1996 period, which coincides with the Japanese
bubble. In the last decade of our sample period, the impact of volume is less than half
the coefficient estimated on the full sample, but we must keep in mind that we only
observe transactions that occurred over a limited time span (purchases that took place in
the beginning of that decade given that the holding period averages more than 6 years).
Moreover, prices soared after 2001 and our dataset do not include transactions from the
2008-2009 price collapse.
[Insert Tables VI and VII about here]
V. Discussion
This paper documents evidence supporting theories where agents engage in speculative
trading that pushes art price above fundamentals, which are defined, for a given work
of art, as the private valuation of the most optimistic agent. A key feature of these
models is that pessimists cannot sell short, which implies that their own valuations are
not incorporated into prices. Our main findings can be summarized as follows: (i) a high
trading volume coincides with more speculative trades and higher market sentiment, (ii)
prices and volume are significantly correlated, and this correlation is higher in the most
volatile segments of the art market, and (iii) a high volume predicts negative returns. We
readily argued that these findings are difficult to reconcile with a model where agents hold
identical beliefs and trade on the basis of taste or wealth. In this section, we examine
alternative mechanisms that can generate some of these findings and discuss alternative
interpretations.
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A. Time-varying Risk Premia
The most straightforward explanation of return predictability is that risk premia or dis-
count rates vary over time (Cochrane, 2011). To the extent that our volume measure
correlates with discount rates, the predictability we observe is consistent with a rational
model. For example, volume may vary with business cycles fluctuations, such that when
volume is low, art collectors demand higher risk premia for holding works of art. It seems
however fairly unlikely that art volume would capture business cycle fluctuations or risk
premia, which are not readily captured by the four risk factors we include in our pricing
model. Moreover, we readily argued that such a model would be unable to explain the
composition of volume, for example that the share of short-term transactions is signifi-
cantly related to volume and prices. Finally, we showed that when volume is very high,
collectors on average earned negative returns, which is incompatible with the assumption
that predictability reflects a risk premium.
B. Alternative Bubble Models
In a seminal article, Blanchard and Watson (1983) provide a bubble model that is fully
consistent with rational expectations and constant expected returns. The overpricing
component in asset prices is independent of the asset’s fundamental and bursts on any
period with a constant probability. If the bubble does not burst, it grows at a faster
rate than the discount rate. It may therefore be rational to ride a bubble, if it grows
on average at the same rate as the discount rate. Although rational bubbles can occur
in infinite horizon models, the theoretical conditions needed to support them are quite
stringent and generally require that the asset price bubble not emerge over time. If, for
instance, new works of art are created when prices increase, and if these new works are
viewed as appropriate substitutes for existing works of art, no bubble can emerge.22 An
important difference between rational bubble models and the resale option theory is that
rational bubbles must grow explosively, while the bubble component generated by the
resale option is stationary over time. It is this stationary component that fuels return
predictability, while rational bubble models generally assume that expected returns are
22See e.g. Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) for further discussion on the theoretical conditions required
to support rational bubbles.
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constant over time.
An important strand of the behavioral finance literature suggests that investors are
likely to form expectations by extrapolating past price changes, which may generate bub-
bles. This idea features prominently in many classical accounts of asset bubbles (e.g.
Kindleberger (1978), Minsky (1986), Shiller (2000)). Investors extrapolate past prices be-
cause they suffer from behavioral biases such as the representativeness bias, a tendency to
view events as typical of some specific class (Barberis et al., 1998), or the self-attribution
bias, a tendency to attribute success to one’s own ability but failure to external factors
(Daniel et al., 1998). A central prediction of these models is time series momentum:
returns should be positively autocorrelated. Table III provides little support for this pre-
diction, where returns are not found to be significantly autocorrelated when controlling
for lagged volume. Furthermore, returns are only positively autocorrelated for the High
Volatility art movements (model 4).
C. Credit and Leverage Cycles
A frequent explanation of asset prices bubbles emphasizes the role of credit and lever-
age. This is particularly true for the real estate market, most people borrow to buy
houses. Stein (1995) argues that, because the ability to borrow is directly tied to the
value of houses, a positive income shock that increases housing demand and real estate
prices relaxes the borrowing constraint, which further increases the demand for houses.
In a heterogeneous-beliefs model, Geanakoplos (2010) introduces a mechanism where pes-
simistic agents are willing to finance investments made by optimistic agents. In contrast
to resale option models, beliefs do not change over time, and therefore there is no resell
premium. Large price fluctuations are attributed to fluctuations in endogenous leverage,
which is too high in booming periods and too low in declining periods.
These credit and leverage models predict that changes in wealth may have more-
than-proportional effects on asset prices, while resale option models emphasize the role
of fluctuations in beliefs. A distinct feature of the art market is that credit and leverage
play almost no role. Auction houses may sometimes lend part of the purchase to buyers,
but this practice is uncommon and confined to major purchases (Thompson, 2009).23 It
23Auction houses can also provide guarantees to sellers who are concerned that not enough bidders will
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is therefore quite unlikely that art price fluctuations are driven by credit cycles.
D. Loss Aversion
The disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) can also explain a positive price-volume
relation. If loss averse collectors decide to delay losses and choose not to sell in falling
markets, then price declines could predict a decrease in trading volume. In a framework
close to ours, Clayton et al. (2008) provide strong support for this hypothesis in the US
real estate market, where real-estate prices are shown to Granger-cause trading volume.
Statman et al. (2006) argue that Granger causality of prices towards volume can also be
generated by overconfidence about one’s trading skills and they provide evidence for both
the disposition effect and overconfidence in the stock market.
If loss aversion is driving the price-volume correlation in the art market, we expect
lagged returns to have some forecasting power and negative returns to predict drops in
volume. This is precisely what we find in Table VIII, which reports that art market losses
forecast low volumes. For the full sample (model 1), a 10% drop in art prices is related to
an average decline of 1.8% in volume, an effect significant at the 5% level. We find that
this relation is strongest for the most risky art movements (model 2).
These findings are in line with Graddy et al. (2014) who provide evidence of loss
aversion in repeat-sale art data. The disposition effect is therefore likely to amplify
the fall in volume following market crashes, but is by definition unable to drive the
contemporaneous booms in both prices and volumes.
[Insert Table VIII about here]
E. Volume and the Cross Section of Art Returns
It is important to emphasize that our results pertain to the time series dimension of
art returns. We find little evidence of a cross-sectional relation between trading volume
and returns. Although some art movements are more speculative than others, we do not
enter the auctions for their items. Such guarantees can also be provided by third parties. Graddy and
Hamilton (2014) study the effect of guarantees (both in-house and third party) and find that they have
no economic effect on final prices.
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find that, within a given year, high volume artists tend to earn lower returns. Fads can
temporarily affect the prices of some artists, as shown by Penasse et al. (2014), but they
are not systematically characterized by large volumes. To put it differently, our findings
suggest that changes in volume reflect shocks that affect the market as a whole, where
“fads” pertain to the cross section of art returns.
To illustrate this, we use the repeat-sale dataset and construct three portfolios based
on trading volume. For each year of a purchase, we sort transactions based on the volume
variable defined in section I and we allocate to the first portfolio all purchases falling in
the lowest volume tercile, to the second portfolio the transactions from the second tercile
and to the third portfolio the transactions with the highest volume. In each case, we apply
the RSR methodology to estimate returns; in other words, we “buy” and “sell” whenever
the owner bought and sold in reality. We show the evolution of each price index in Figure
7. If high volume artists where overpriced with respect to low volume artists, we would
expect the “high volume” strategy to underperform in the long run.24 Although the “high
volume” strategy appears to be more volatile than the two others, especially during the
peak of 1990, we find no evidence of underperformance. For example, the p-value of a t-test
on the difference between “high volume” and “low volume” returns is 0.14. In contrast to
the results of Section IV, where we allocated sales based on the time series dimension, the
strategies based on the cross-sectional dimension show little heterogeneity. This suggests
that volume contains little information about whether a given art movement is subject to
a temporary fad. Indeed, we readily argued that volume across art movements is mostly
affected by common shocks, which we attributed to changes in market sentiment. This
result also rules out the interpretation of the predictive results of Section IV in terms of
liquidity premia. If art collectors were willing to pay a premium for the most liquid (and
volatile) art movements, we would plausibility obtain a cross-sectional relation between
trading volume and returns.
[Insert Figure 7 about here]
24The underperformance of high-volume stocks is pervasive in the literature (see e.g. Brennan et al.




The art market is subject to large fluctuations that characterize prices and trading volume,
and that are difficult to reconcile with a rational model which captures how people trade
to consume. This paper argues that limits to arbitrage, namely the impossibility to sell
art short, induce a speculative component to art prices. As pessimists cannot short-sell,
their opinions are not incorporated into art prices, which hence only reflect the opinion
of the most optimistic collectors. As a result, an optimist is willing to pay more than her
own private value because she knows that, in the future, there may be other collectors
that value the work of art more than she does. The difference between her willingness to
pay and her own private value reflects a speculative motive, the value of the right to sell
the work of art in the future.
This paper investigates this theory by looking at the behavior of art prices and volumes
and by directly measuring returns over a comprehensive data set of worldwide art auctions.
Rising prices tend to be accompanied by more short-term transactions, which we interpret
as trading frenzies, given the huge trading costs that characterize the art market. Trading
frenzies tend to concentrate on the works of Modern and Contemporary artists, for which
prices and volume are on average more volatile and more correlated. When trading
volume is high, we find that buyers tend to overpay, in that a high volume strongly
predicts negative returns in the subsequent years. Art returns are therefore predictable,
not because risk premia change over time as in traditional models, but instead because




Hedonic regressions are a popular methodology for constructing constant-quality price
indexes for infrequently traded goods like houses or collectibles. Hedonic models control
for temporal variation in the quality of the transacted goods by attributing implicit prices
to their “utility-bearing characteristics” (Rosen, 1974). Our model relates the natural logs
of USD hammer prices to quarterly dummies, while controlling for a wide range of hedonic
characteristics. More formally, our regression can be expressed as follows:






γtDkt + εkt (4)
where Pkt represents the real USD price of an art object k at time t, Xmkt is the value of
characteristicm of item k at time t, andDkt is a dummy variable that equals one if object k
is sold in time period t. The coefficients βm reflect the attribution of a relative shadow price
to each of the m characteristics. The estimates of γt can be used to construct an art price
index.25 Apart from the variables related to the timing of the sale, the hedonic variables
X used are the same as in Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013), and capture characteristics of
the artist (through the inclusion of artist dummies and an art history textbook dummy),
the work (through the inclusion of variables capturing attribution, authenticity, medium,
size, and topic), and the sale (through the inclusion of auction house dummies). The
R-squareds of the different hedonic regressions lie between 56% and 76% (detailed results
available on request).
25A subtle point is that the resulting index tracks the geometric means — not the arithmetic means
— means of prices over time, due to the log transformation prior to estimation.
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Figure 1: Price, Volume and Short Term Transactions During the 1990 Bubble
This figure shows aggregate art prices, the total volume of transactions, and the share
of short-term transactions during the 1990 bubble (1980-1995). Prices and volume are
expressed in function of their 1980 level (left scale). The share of short-term transactions
is defined as the share of purchases that were resold within the next year, and is computed
from the repeat-sale data set (right scale).
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(a) High Volatility movements


















(b) Low Volatility movements






















Figure 2: Prices and Volumes of 13 Art Movements (1976-2006)
This figure plots prices and volume for each of the thirteen art movements, with 1976 as
their standardized benchmark level.
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(a) Returns and Volatility



































Cubism, Futurism and Constructivism
Minimalism and Contemporary
(b) Volatility and Price-Volume Correlation
Figure 3: Returns, Volatility and Price-Volume Correlation
These figures are scatter-plots of the first and second moments of the return series (the
values of which are provided in Table I). Panel (a) plots the average return of each of
the thirteen art movements of our sample against their volatility. Panel (b) plots the
volatility of each movement against their price-volume correlation.
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Figure 4: Detrended market volume
This figure plots the monthly measure of volume constructed by means of Equation (1)
and the whole sample of 1.1 million of auction transactions. Each month t we take the
log of the total number of sales on the last twelve months preceding t. We then normalize
our series by subtracting the log of the average number of sales over the last five years.















Figure 5: Artist Fame: Andy Warhol and Pop Art
This figure depicts the share of mentions of Andy Warhol’s and Roy Lichtenstein’s names
in the Google Books database, and of the average share of the 111 Pop artists in our data
set.
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Figure 6: Volume and Abnormal Returns
This figure shows abnormal returns expressed by volume deciles (whereby decile 10 corre-
sponds to the largest volume). Each repeat-sale transaction is identified by purchase and
sale date. We construct “portfolios” of paintings based on volume at the time of purchase
or sale. Volume is constructed according to Equation (1) (see also Figure 4). We compute
the average abnormal return of each “portfolio” and rank them from the lowest volume
(first decile) to highest (tenth decile) for the full sample and specific subgroups. Abnormal
returns are defined as annualized returns in excess of the sample average. The dashed
lines indicate the 5% confidence bands around the null of absence of abnormal returns.
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Figure 7: Repeat-Sales Price Indices
This figure presents the prices indices constructed from the “Low Volume”, “Moderate
Volume” and “High Volume” strategies (described in Section V.E). The indices are ob-
tained by applying a repeat-sale regression to resale pairs allocated to each volume tercile.
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Table I: Time Series Data: Sample statistics
Price changes Volume changes Price-volume
correlation
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Abstract Expressionism 4.2 22.3 -74.1 41.7 5.7 19.5 -76.4 30.8 78.0
Baroque 3.2 13.2 -22.9 26.0 -0.2 11.3 -30.7 18.8 24.1
Cubism, Futurism, and Constructivism 3.3 20.7 -64.9 40.6 3.3 16.6 -61.7 26.0 56.5
Dada and Surrealism 3.5 18.7 -55.8 30.8 2.9 16.9 -53.7 39.1 64.0
Fauvism and Expressionism 2.8 17.9 -55.6 38.5 2.1 14.6 -47.6 28.2 42.0
Impressionism and Symbolism 3.1 16.4 -50.4 39.5 2.3 15.4 -50.6 29.3 54.9
Minimalism and Contemporary 5.3 23.7 -53.4 42.6 12.1 24.7 -50.9 59.8 41.8
Medieval and Renaissance 3.5 17.7 -34.8 50.3 0.4 13.6 -38.5 27.9 21.6
Neoclassicism 3.0 18.8 -40.0 62.7 2.4 13.6 -21.0 32.2 23.5
Pop 5.0 27.7 -83.1 55.9 7.2 19.7 -58.1 53.2 57.4
Realism 2.3 15.2 -38.2 35.6 2.9 13.1 -36.4 30.9 34.7
Rococo 3.4 14.2 -22.8 36.0 0.6 13.7 -26.1 23.5 13.0
Romanticism 3.4 13.7 -29.8 28.2 2.4 11.3 -19.9 27.7 36.2
Art market 3.6 13.8 -32.0 37.4 3.8 10.3 -26.7 20.0 54.3
This table presents the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation (S.D.), minimum, maximum, and price-volume correlation)
of the log-differences of prices and volumes, for each of the thirteen movements and for the whole art market, expressed in percentage
terms.
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Table II: Repeat-sale Data: Sample Statistics
Mean S.D. Min Max
ART 1.20 78.43 −458.20 554.05
EQ MKT 11.97 28.85 −77.86 128.06
SMB 4.87 21.64 −61.43 89.12
HML 24.12 29.60 −57.08 164.11
LIQ 31.13 38.55 −28.20 198.95
FAME −6.03 40.49 −367.89 401.86
VOLUME −2.80 19.46 −107.82 74.91
N 24889
This table presents the descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation (S.D.), minimum and
maximum) of the variables used in our repeat-sale analysis. All variables are expressed in per-
centage changes between each resale pair. ART is the return on artworks between the purchase







measures equity excess returns, and SML, HML and LIQ are the Fama and French (1996) and
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) risk factors. FAME is the share of mentions in Google Books for
each artist and VOLUME is the volume measure, defined in Equation (1).















Short-term transactions 0.35 0.58 1.00
Sales rate 0.22 0.36 0.19 1.00
Art objects offered for
sale
0.47 0.86 0.52 -0.15 1.00
Modern and
Contemporary
0.59 0.52 0.50 0.02 0.57 1.00
Top income 0.35 0.23 0.29 0.22 0.14 0.26 1.00
This table presents pairwise correlations between price, volume, the share of short-term transactions, the
sales rate, the number of art objects offered for sale, the share of Modern and Contemporary items, and
the top income. The variables are observed annually over the period 1976-2006. Each independent variable
is expressed in log-difference. The price is the hedonic price index. Volume is the number of transactions
observed each year based on data from Renneboog and Spaenjers (2013). Short-term transactions is the
number of purchases that were resold within the next year, and come from the repeat-sale data set. Sales rate
is the average percentage of items sold at auctions for each year. The number of art objects offered for sale
is the proxy for the number of items offered at auctions, obtained by dividing the number of transactions by
the sales rate. Modern and Contemporary indicates the share of Abstract Expressionism, Pop Art, and other
Modern and Contemporary Art within the global art market (the aggregate of the thirteen art movements).
Top income is the share of total income received by the top 0.1 percent of all income earners in the US,
constructed by Piketty and Saez (2006). Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in bold.
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Table IV: Price-Volume Correlation
All Movements High Volatility Low Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Contemporaneous Correlation
∆ Price ∆ Price ∆ Price ∆ Price ∆ Price ∆ Price
∆ Volume 0.590∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.247∗∗
(3.32) (3.55) (3.36) (3.63) (2.16) (2.14)
∆ Stock -0.133 0.036 -0.148
(-0.67) (0.15) (-0.79)
∆−1 Stock 0.284 0.075 0.241
(1.41) (0.32) (1.29)
R2 0.251 0.279 0.395 0.396 0.054 0.099
N 377 377 87 87 87 87
Panel B: Price Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Price ∆ Price ∆ Price ∆ Price ∆ Price ∆ Price
∆−1 Price -0.036 0.156 -0.056
(-0.27) (1.29) (-0.42)
∆−1 Volume 0.258
∗∗ 0.235∗∗ 0.315∗∗ 0.216∗ 0.338∗ 0.312∗
(2.01) (2.58) (2.06) (1.96) (1.96) (1.77)
∆−1 Stock 0.318 0.321 0.210
(1.20) (0.86) (0.59)
R2 0.052 0.073 0.096 0.133 0.080 0.092
N 377 377 87 87 87 87
Panel C: Volume Changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Volume ∆ Volume ∆ Volume ∆ Volume ∆ Volume ∆ Volume
∆−1 Price 0.078 0.112 0.146 0.214
∗ -0.010 0.002




∆−1 Stock 0.213 0.370 0.234
(0.82) (1.27) (0.94)
R2 0.007 0.037 0.021 0.062 0.000 0.036
N 377 377 87 87 87 87
Panel A and B report the estimation results for price changes on (lagged) volume changes, with and
without controlling for lagged price changes and equity returns. Panel C comprises the estimation results
for volume changes on lagged price changes, while controlling for lagged volume changes and equity
returns. The annual series in Panel A are constructed from the full sample, while those in Panel B
and C are constructed from fourth-quarter observations (see Section III). We report the results for
the aggregated art prices and volume (comprising 13 art movements), and for the aggregated three
most volatile movements (Pop, Abstract Expressionism, Minimalism and Contemporary art) and the
aggregated three least volatile art schools of art (Romanticism, Baroque, Rococo). Standard errors are
clustered at year and movement level.
(t-Statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.)
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Table V: Volume and Abnormal Returns
Decile Purchase Sale Purchase Sale Purchase Sale
Full sample High Volatility Low Volatility
Low −0.99∗ −8.25∗∗∗ 0.34 −3.75∗∗ −0.52 −1.49
2 3.95∗∗∗ −5.57∗∗∗ 5.51∗∗∗ −12.92∗∗∗ 3.18 −4.21
3 2.24∗∗∗ −3.44∗∗∗ −1.62 −6.19∗∗∗ 0.50 −3.60
4 1.12∗∗ −1.08∗∗∗ 4.30∗∗∗ −4.40∗∗∗ 0.33 0.52
5 0.69 0.30 1.24 0.80 0.36 0.30
6 −0.27 0.13 0.60 −1.19 −1.93 0.72
7 0.07 1.02∗∗ −4.23∗∗∗ 8.62∗∗∗ −0.66 1.32
8 −2.29∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 0.84 5.92∗∗∗ −0.09 3.34
9 −1.03∗∗ 5.90∗∗∗ −4.38∗∗∗ 2.51∗ −1.34 3.22
High −3.52∗∗∗ 9.32∗∗∗ −2.68∗∗ 10.82∗∗∗ 0.06 −0.12
This table presents the annualized returns in excess of the average (abnormal return) by volume
decile (decile 10 corresponds to the largest volume). Each repeat-sale transaction is identified
by purchase and sale date. We construct “portfolios” of paintings based on volume at the time
of purchase or sale. Volume is constructed according to Equation (1). We compute the average
abnormal return of each “portfolio” and rank them from the lowest volume (first decile) to
highest (tenth decile) for the full sample and specific subgroups. Abnormal returns are defined
as annualized returns in excess of the sample average. The “Full sample” corresponds to Figure
6. “High Volatility” are sales of Pop, Abstract Expressionist, and Modern and Contemporary art
(N = 2822), and “Low Volatility” are sales of Romantic, Baroque and Rococo art (N = 1107).
(∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.)
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Table VI: Volume and Overpricing
Full sample High Volatility Low Volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α -0.001 -0.026∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.163∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗
(-0.11) (-3.55) (0.69) (-7.03) (-4.76) (-2.44)
MARKET 0.192∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(10.97) (14.40) (9.45) (7.62) (5.21) (4.23)
SMB 0.353∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ -0.153
(10.61) (3.85) (-1.02)
HML -0.268∗∗∗ -0.083 -0.727∗∗∗
(-9.07) (-0.90) (-5.18)
LIQ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(6.76) (5.80) (3.89)
FAME 0.147∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.008 0.001
(13.05) (15.17) (2.91) (5.95) (0.16) (0.02)
VOLUME 0.777∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.213∗ 0.183
(29.10) (27.97) (2.43) (4.38) (1.73) (1.51)
R2 0.055 0.064 0.033 0.083 0.038 0.058
N 24889 24889 3361 3361 1052 1052



























rit is the return on item i between bi and si, computed as the difference
between the log of sale price and the log of purchase price and where rft is the risk free rate. The
variable MKTt is the world equity excess returns between purchase and sale times, SMBt and
HMLt are the Fama and French (1996) factors and LIQt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
liquidity factor. FAMEa,t is the log of the share of mentions in Google Books for artist a at time
t. VOLUMEm,t is the volume measure defined in Equation (1) for movement m. The three-
stage-generalized-least square RSR estimation of Case and Shiller (1987) is used to estimate the
regression for the three samples.
(t-Statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.)
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Table VII: The “Pricing” of Volume by Subperiod
1977-1986 1987-1996 1997-2006
CAPM 0.491∗∗∗ 1.070∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(11.89) (29.58) (4.91)
Fama-French 0.556∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(13.26) (26.92) (3.87)


































rit is the return on item i between bi and si, computed as the difference
between the log of sale price and the log of purchase price and where rft is the risk free rate. The
variable MKTt is the world equity excess returns between purchase and sale times, SMBt and
HMLt are the Fama and French (1996) factors and LIQt is the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
liquidity factor. FAMEa,t is the log of the share of mentions in Google Books for artist a at time
t. VOLUMEm,t is the volume measure defined in Equation 1 for movement m. The variables
νi, i = 1 . . . 3 measure the impact of volume on excess returns for each sub-period: 1977-1986,
1987-1996 and 1997-2006. The three-stage-generalized-least square RSR estimation of Case and
Shiller (1987) is used to estimate the regression for the three samples.
(t-Statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.)
47
Table VIII: Asymmetric Effects Of Lagged Returns On Volume
All Movements High Volatility Low volatility
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Volume ∆ Volume ∆ Volume








∆−1 Stock 0.272 0.466 0.325
(1.04) (1.58) (1.09)
R2 0.043 0.077 0.053
N 377 87 87
This table reports the estimated coefficients of a regression of volume on lagged returns,
which separates positive from negative values of lagged log differences of art prices (gains
and losses). The series are constructed from fourth-quarter observations (see Section III.B
and Table IV). The “Gains” (respectively “Losses”) series correspond to change in price
when the latter is positive (respectively negative) and zero otherwise. We report the
results for the aggregated art prices and volume (comprising 13 art movements), and for
the aggregated three most volatile movements (Pop, Abstract Expressionism, Minimalism
and Contemporary art) and the three least volatile art paradigms (Romanticism, Baroque,
Rococo). Standard errors are clustered at year and movement level.
(∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.)
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